E-Commerce challenges traditional approaches to assessing monopolistic practices due to the rapid rate of growth, rapid change in technology, difficulty in assessing market share for information products like web sites, and high degree of interconnectivity and alliance formation among corporations. This paper has provided a fundamental framework that integrates a network and economic perspective to understand IT markets.
Introduction:
According to a report by Cyveillance (2000) , as of June 2000, there were 2.1 billion indexable pages 1 on the web. By Jan. 2001, 4 billion pages are expected. People find web pages via search engines (Nielsen Study, 1997; Ernst & Young, 1998; GVU, 1998; NetRatings, 1999; IMT Strategies, 2000) , web sites that assist Internet users to locate other web sites (domain names) or pages (Uniform Resource Locator, URL). Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson (1999) observed that the search cost for individual users increases due to the sheer volume of information. Search engines help users reduce search costs to find web pages. Therefore, search engines are the "portals" to the rest of the Web and thus attract high hit rates. Of the top 10 web sites studied by MediaMetrix (2000), nine provide general search services 2 .
Establishing a web site on the Internet is very easy; however, not every site gains equal attention. Adamic and Huberman (1999) in a study of log files from AOL found that the top 5 % of sites attract 75 % of the users. Hence, a small number of sites command the traffic of a large segment of the web population. This is a characteristic of winner-take-all markets (Frank and Cook, 1995) . According to a study in June 2000 from Neilsen/NetRatings 3 , Yahoo had 47 % of audience reach 4 , which means 47 % of the survey participants had been to the Yahoo web site during the survey period. After Yahoo, MSN, Go, and Netscape had 35 %, 19 %, and 15 % audience reach, respectively 5 . These numbers indicate high concentration as defined by audience reach. They also showed that Yahoo and MSN have continuously increased their audience reach while most other search engines have decreased. If the Web is a winner-take-all market, then some web sites will dominate the market. To date, some of the search engines have gained high hit rates (Nielsen/NetRatings, 2000) and may dominate the market. Do search engines have monopoly power?
Monopoly power is a key factor in antitrust cases. However, antitrust related issues on the Web have not gained significant attention. Rather, attention has been focused on issues such as pricing, trust, and loyalty (Bailey, 1998; Kollock, 1999; Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox, 2000) . Sheremata (1998) stated that antitrust policy and enforcement in information technology (IT) industries appear to be difficult. The dynamics of competition and industrial organization in these industries are difficult to understand, due to the special nature of the new economy and to the scarcity of research about the IT industries (Sheremata, 1998) . The Microsoft antitrust case has caused many discussions about the characteristics and conduct of these industries as well as debates over antitrust policies and remedies in the IT industries. Nevertheless, the nature of competition on the Web is still not clearly understood. Since search engines attract significant attention from users, studies of search engines are popular (Nielsen Study, 1997; Ernst & Young, 1998; GVU, 1998; NetRatings, 1999; IMT Strategies, 2000) , but they do not provide an understanding of the industry. This paper tries to understand the search engine market from a perspective that integrates technology, behavior, economics, social networks, and organizational theory. This enables a more comprehensive evaluation of whether or not search engines have monopoly power. The conduct and performance of search engine sites will be discussed. Since the Web is still in its early stage of development, understanding the technology and behavior of the Web can help policy makers determine the relevance of existing antitrust legislation to E-Commerce.
Motivation: Microsoft Case Background Information and Debates:
The Department of Justice (DOJ), 20 state attorneys general, and the District of Columbia filed broad antitrust lawsuits against the Microsoft Corporation on May 18, 1998, charging that Microsoft had illegally thwarted competition to protect and extend its monopoly over personal computing software. Essentially, the government contended that Microsoft was violating the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by using its monopoly of Windows 95 to dominate the Internet browser market 6 .
As Microsoft's conduct was somewhat different from standard antitrust behavior with respect to monopoly and anticompetitive activities, it became a controversial question whether Microsoft was involved with antitrust issues. The pros and cons of antitrust action against Microsoft (Spaulding, 2000; Thierer, 1997; the Chicago Tribune, 1997) in terms of the key issues of monopoly power, price, quality, innovation, and competition are listed in Table 1 . The Microsoft case illustrates that in IT industries the case for and against monopolistic practices is somewhat different than in non-IT industries. Microsoft had a monopoly (90% of market share in the Operating System market), high production differentiation (hard to find similar products), and there was a high entry barrier. In addition, Microsoft was involved with many computer manufacturers and Internet service/content providers and had forced them to conduct anticompetitive acts. dramatically increased the number of other organizations with which it was allied (i.e., the degree of centrality increased). This was correlated with Microsoft's growth on other fronts and its increase in market share. Indicators based on analyses of the inter-organizational network structure and the market economy support the claim that
Microsoft had monopolistic power. The search engine industry is another IT industry.
Will we see a similar pattern of behavior to that observed in the Microsoft case?
Research Model
A standard approach to analyze markets used by Industrial Organization
Economists (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995 A complementary approach has been taken by organizational theorists, who argue that organizations are not independent; rather, the market is a social network (e.g. White, 1981a White, , 1981b Baker, 1984a Baker, , 1984b Faulkner, 1983) . Further, this inter-organizational network affects the performance of organizations and their ability to constrain and enable the deployment of new products and the entry of new organizations (Burt, 1982; Leifer and White, 1987) . If core actors control important resources in the economy, they possess the means to control economic decisions (Parsions and Smelser, 1956) . Core actors tend to be more profitable (Burt, 1983) . Social network relationships not only help firms control resources in order to affect economic decisions, but also help firms overcome the uncertainty and distrust that often plague market exchange (Granovetter, 1985) . Interconnection among firms facilitates the flow of resources and information, but also increases the possibility that firms who are connected as a subnetwork pursue their interests, such as increasing price, reducing competition, deterring new entrants, etc. Taking these inter-organizational networks into account leads to an extension of the SCP model as shown in Figure 1 with the addition of the shaded box.
Preliminary Investigation of Search Engines

Definition of the Market of Major Search Engines
Although there are several types of search engines 8 , in this paper, we focus on the major search engines that provide general search services. 
Popularity
DirectHit is widely known for its popularity methodology. DirectHit collects data about what people click on when search results are provided to them from the DirectHit and HotBot sites. The database is updated periodically. The more people click on a site, the higher ranking that web site is given.
Commercial
Goto is one of the "Commercial" search engines. How sites are ranked as a result of a search is based on how much they pay for each click. The basic concept is similar to the yellow pages. Commercial search engines believe that the more web sites pay for each click, the better the quality of the web sites. Therefore, when users click on higher ranked web sites, they presumably visit higher quality web sites.
Hybrid
Some search engines employ hybrid search techniques 13 in an attempt to increase coverage. Some search engines provide second opinions from other search engines following their initial results.
Network Structure of Search Engines
So far, none of the search techniques employed by the search organizations can adequately cover the whole web. Thus, interconnection of search engines sites is one way centrality is degree, the number of other nodes the node in question is connected to.
Degree can be separated into indegree (the number of other search engines that connect to the engine in question) and outdegree (the number of other search engines to which the engine in question connects to).
Betweenness and information are also used to measure node centrality. Freeman (1979) uses betweenness centrality 14 to measure the extent to which a particular node lies "between" the various other nodes in the graph: a point of relatively low degree may play an important "intermediary" role and so be very central to the network (Scott, 1991) .
Information centrality 15 measures the information contained in all paths originating with a specific node. The information of a node averages the information in these paths, which, in turn is inversely related to the variance in the transmission of a signal from a node to another (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) .
We collected data on the hyperlinks connecting search engine web sites over a We checked the 19 search engines listed in the rating from Nielsen/NetRatings in June, 2000. At each site, we used four types of keywords, including "travel" (popular word) "Citibank" (company name) "Tair-Rong Sheu" (unusual name), and "fdkhgugn" Table 2 summarizes the way in which average centrality changes over time 18 . The degree of centrality has increased on average from August to December, although the trend is not monotonic. This increase is a sign of network structuration -the maturation and development of a stable network of relations that control an industry. There is also a fairly high degree of variance, regardless of the centrality measure used. This indicates that there is an unequal distribution of power in this industry. The top 4 sites with the highest centrality for each network measure are shown in Table 3 . 
Standard Market Structure of Search Engines
Three additional concepts: concentration, product differentiation, and entry barriers, are used to describe the market structure of the search engines. These are important measures used by the Department of Justice to evaluate markets. We will later compare the characteristics of the search engine market to the criteria listed in 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines 19 and discuss policy implications.
The market structure analysis is conducted using the top 19 search engines 20 listed by Nielsen/NetRatings. We make two assumptions: (1) 
Concentration
To determine concentration, three measures are used: the four-firm concentration ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and the Network Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
z Four-firms concentration ratio (CR4) from Jul. 1999 to Jun., 2000
A concentration ratio is the most widely used index to measure concentration (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995) . The four-firms concentration ratio reflects the share of total industry sales accounted for by the 4 largest firms. In order to calculate the total market share, the "market" has to be defined. It is necessary in practice to make difficult judgements about what products and firms constitute the market (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995 
Pi is the firm i's percentage of total industry sales (i.e., its market share), where N is the number of firms. The HHI ranges from 10,000 (a pure monopoly market) to a number close to zero (an atomistic market).
There are 19 search engines included in this calculation (N=19; Pi is defined above).
The average HHI is 1163 over the period from Jul. 1999 to Jun. 2000 25 .
z Network Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (NAHHI)
We propose to use NAHHI to evaluate the concentration of web sites. Hyperlinks placed on web pages form a network and facilitate users visiting from one site to another.
Therefore, the market share (audience reach) of a site should incorporate the audience that may follow hyperlinks to visit it. If search engines are not connected to each other, the NAHHI is equal to HHI. If search engines are connected to each other, users may follow those links to visit other search engines and become aware of and familiar with those search engines. NAHHI reflects potential market shares that search engines would acquire through interconnection and substitute information provided to users through hyperlinks. The higher the network density (interconnection), the lower the NAHHI. To calculate NAHHI, based on the indegree of search engines, we derive the "possible" audience reach (market share), which is the sum of its audience reach and the audience reach of those search engines that place a hyperlink pointing to it. Because users may visit more than one search engine (i.e., the total audience reach exceeds 100 %), we normalize the possible audience reach by taking the possible audience divided by the sum of the possible audience reach of the 19 search engines 26 . The NAHHI for August 2000 is 870, which is smaller than the HHI. The reason is that, after interconnecting to each other, the audience reach of search engines is more equally distributed. When the network effect is taken into account, there is less evidence for concentration.
Product Differentiation
Users often start from search engines to explore other web pages. However, the frequency with which commercial web sites are visited is proportional to revenue. One strategy that search engines use to increase visits is to offer additional services such as free e-mail, news, chat, weather, etc. This differentiates their products.
In addition to search service, products that search engines offer often fall into three product categories: (1) Non-personalized features, such as News, Weather, Stock Quote, Map, etc. For these features, personal information is not required; (2) Personalized features, such as E-mail, Online Chat, Online Game, etc. With personalized features, sites can attract more users and lock them in (Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox, 2000) ; (3) Platforms, such as online shopping, auctions, etc. Older search engines (Table 4) tend to offer products other than just search service. This increases users' switching costs. The top 4 search engines tend to develop personal features (Table 5 ). Logistic regressions of the presence or absence of three different product features
(1 = present, 0 = absent) onto the year of startup (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) show that the earlier the setup date of a search engine, the higher the probability of providing products other than search service that attract and lock in users (Table 6 ). The predicted probability curves of three different product features are shown in Figure 6 -1 to 6-3. 
Entry Barriers
The entry barrier of running a search engine is increasing over time due to the increasing size of the web, and increased switching costs resulted from products (e.g. e-mail) that lock in users. In the previous section, we observed that many search engines provide products that function to lock in users. Since we haven't empirically examined the locking effect in this paper, in the following we provide a qualitative argument over entry barriers. 
Policy Implications & Future Directions
In this paper, we have tried to assess whether search engines have monopoly power by investigating the network structure and the market structure. In order to understand whether the structure of the search engine market is potentially problematic, we compare the characteristics of the search engine market to 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Table 7) . These guidelines describe some analytical foundations of merger enforcement and provide guidance enabling the business community to avoid antitrust problems when planning mergers. According to the guidelines, the search engine market is moderately concentrated based on the HHI. If there were any merger that would cause HHI to increase more than 100 points, then the merger would raise significant competitive concerns 30 and need further investigation. In Figure 8 , the gray cells indicate that there are 29 possible mergers that could result in HHI increasing by more than 100 points. However, the market would be considered unconcentrated if NAHHI were taken into account. It shows that interconnection of search engines reduces the possibility of getting a concentrated market because audience reach may be more equally distributed through interconnection. Since the search engine industry is concerned with the flow of information among sites, the NAHHI may provide a more accurate reflection of actual concentration.
The statistical data of the top 19 search engines show that in most cases, the date of setup is critical to success. However, some new engines (e.g. iWon), with special promotion, can still achieve high audience reach in a short time. Therefore, new entrants may still affect markets and prevent anticompetition. Whether this will continue to be the case as the exponential growth of the web continues remains to be seen.
Several conducts of search engines are relevant to the investigation of anticompetition:
z Search engines don't charge users but advertisers.
Search engines provide free search services to users but make money by selling web spaces to advertisers. Therefore, advertising sales and prices are relevant to evaluate monopoly power of search engines so as to assess social welfare. Unfortunately at this point, data on advertising sales are difficult to collect from public sources because not every search engine is listed on the stock market.
z Some search engines don't connect to other search engines.
According to the study of network structure, we found that 17 of the 19 search engines connect to other search engines. We also found that the interconnection of search engines has an upward trend. However, some search engines such as MSN and iWon don't connect to any other search engines.
z Some search engines are supported by giant parent companies and may be involved with product bundling 31 .
It is well known that Microsoft bundled the IE browser with its OS and therefore was alleged to be anticompetitive. Based on my study, we find similar situations (e.g.,
Microsoft bundles its IE browser with its MSN web site) If, with the help from other monopoly markets, those web sites gain monopoly powers in the search engine market, they would be able to charge advertisers higher price and might even be able to charge users search services. They might also reduce the diversity of product offered once they no longer face strong competition. Such activities could cause a loss of social welfare.
Besides conduct, performance evaluation is also a critical factor in the SCP model.
Quality of search techniques may be used to evaluate performance of search engines whose core service is search, in terms of ranking and relevancy of search results. The quality of ranking and relevancy is inversely proportional to "information search cost", the cost of looking for information. Therefore, further research could investigate "information search cost" as a performance indicator of search techniques. This indicator becomes very important when the amount of information on the Web skyrockets to a degree that makes it difficult decide ranking and relevancy of search results. The situation may be even worse when ranking and relevancy of search results are not decided based on impartial algorithms 32 . As this began to happen, could users know and would they switch to other search engines ? Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox (2000) showed that users are likely to continue to use the same search engine that they have frequently used in the past. They also show that users have more loyalty to a search engine in which they use more personalized features. If search engines keep working on locking in users without improving search techniques or algorithms, this could pose a serious problem. Only a few search engines might exist, providing lower quality and less impartial service than is technically feasible.
Conclusion
E-Commerce challenges traditional approaches to assessing monopolistic practices due to the rapid rate of growth, rapid change in technology, difficulty in assessing market share for information products like web sites, and high degree of interconnectivity and alliance formation among corporations. This paper has provided a fundamental framework that integrates an economic and network perspective to understand IT markets.
Additional work needs to be done to integrate these perspectives and to exam other types of alliance structures and resources. In the future, research is needed on the information search cost of search engines and on technological progress in the information technology industries.
This framework was applied to the search engine market. We study critical characteristics of the search engine market, including major players, search techniques, network structure, and market structure and try to assess whether any search engines have monopoly power given that advertising price in the search engine market is not easily attained and that no price is charged from users for most services provided by search engines. If any anticompetition is alleged in the search engine market, the research findings of this paper will be relevant. The findings indicate that (1) despite an increasing number of search engines, barriers to entry seem high, largely due to the exponential growth in the number of web sites and the non-scalability of the current search technology, and collective switching costs; (2) older search engine sites tend typically to have more features and so greater ability to lock in users. In fact, most users rarely use more than two sites in a single search session. Using standard economic indicators (CR4=58% and HHI=1163), the industry looks close to being plagued by anticompetitive practices. However, the nature of the industry and the relevant technology is such that the web of connection and alliances among search engines is highly critical both to the product being delivered and the way in which business is conducted. Thus, we constructed a network adjusted HHI (NAHHI) and its value was only 870, suggesting that there is less cause for concern.
To date, no search techniques are able to cover the whole web. 10 AOL is not listed in the top 19 search engines by Nielsen/NetRatings. Whether AOL is considered a search engine is controversial since providing Internet access is its core business. However, its subscribers may perform search through its search function. Therefore, the assumption of that the top19 search engines account for 100 % of market shares may be distorted when AOL is considered a search engine and the cross-elasticity demand between AOL and other search engines is high.
11 The advantages and disadvantages of different search techniques are shown as follows:
Search Techniques Advantage Disadvantage Human Editing A great amount of information is processed by editors and is put into related categories.
The amount of information is often growing faster than limited editors can handle.
Crawler
The coverage rate is better than can be reached by human editing.
The ranking and relevancy of search results are difficult to decide for such large amounts of information. Popularity "Hot sites" that attract many people's attention are ranked higher.
Some unpopular sites that could be useful to users would never receive a high ranking. Commercial Users might find sites that pay more for each click match their search better.
Some web sites that don't pay and are highly related to users' search will never show up on top.
12 A crawler search engine mainly has three parts; (1) A spider (also called a "crawler" or a "bot") that follows hypertext links to read every page or representative pages on every web site that wants to be searchable; (2) A program that creates a huge index (sometimes called a "catalog") from the pages that have been read; (3) A program that receives a user's search request, compares it to the entries in the index, and returns results to the user. (whatis.com).
13 For example, Yahoo gives search results from its own directory first. If it can not find any matching from its directory, it will provide search results from Google, a crawler search engine.
14 Please see Wasserman and Faust (1994) , p.188.
15 Please see Wasserman and Faust (1994), p.192. 16 The following matrix contains the data of interconnection among search engines in August 2000. An entry of 1 indicates that the search engine indicated by the row is linked to the one indicated by the column. For example, Alta Vista had a link to number 10 (Look Smart). Ask Jeeves had a link to number 4 (Excite). 21 Based on rating of audience reach of search engines from Nielsen/NetRatings in June, 2000. AOL is not included in my sample because it is not listed by Nielsen/NetRatings and it is often considered an ISP company. However, it also provides search service. Therefore, the assumption of that top19 search engines account for 100 % of market shares may be distorted. 22 The major revenue of search engines comes from advertising sales and is proportional to their audience reach. The more search engine users visit their sponsor web sites, the more revenue the search engines make. Although advertising sales might be used to calculate market shares more accurately, it is difficult in practice to collect this data because most web sites do not release this information. Therefore, we assume the percentage of audience reach is proportional to the percentage of market sales.
23 Please see note3. 24 The trend of concentration ratio is shown as follows:
The M a y -9 9 Jun-9 9 Jul -9 9 A ug -9 9 S e p -9 9 O c t-9 9 N o v -9 9 D e c -9 9 Ja n-0 The indegree data were from Aug. 2000 while the audience reach data were from Jun. 2000 (please see note3). We made an assumption that the audience reach of the search engine i and those search engines that connects to it have 30 % overlap, which means 30 % of their visitors are the same. Based on this assumption, the NAHHI is 870, which indicates an unconcentrated market. In order to reduce the bias of this assumption, we ran a sensitivity analysis varying overlapping rate from 0% to 90%. The NAHHI doesn't change much, still showing an unconcentrated market. Shapiro and Varian (1998) stated that collective switching cost, the combined switching costs of all users, is a challenge to companies to attract users to a new network. Collective switching costs work in a nonlinear way: convincing ten people in a network to switch to a new network is more than ten times as hard as getting one user to switch. The worst problem is that no one wants to be the first to give up the network externality and risk being stranded.
28 Microsoft in 1998 spent $400 million buying Hotmail, which was a web site providing free e-mail and had 10 million members as of Jan. 1998. The average cost of getting a member was $40.
29 Yahoo in 1999 spent $3.5 billion buying Geocities, which was a web site providing free space for publishing web pages and had 3.5 million web sites hosted under it as of Jan. 1999. 30 In the search engine market, CR4 and HHI were 58% and 1183 as of Jun. 2000. According to 1992 Merger Guidelines, this market is moderately concentrated. When there is a merger producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points, post-merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns. 31 The following table shows the examples of search engines that are bundled with other products or services from the same parent companies.
Search Engine Parent Company
Product Bundling MSN Microsoft The default homepage of IE either links to MSN web site or has a hyperlink pointing to MSN web site. It is estimated that IE dominates 75% of the browser market. Every time when IE is activated, it will show MSN web site unless users change the default web page(more than 60% of users don't change the default homepage.) and MSN site will gain one hit.
